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The thalidomide tragedy, which resulted in thousands of deaths and disabilities in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, changed medicine forever. One of its outcomes was the establishment 
of more robust mechanisms for the regulation of medicines and medical devices. 
Regulatory bodies – including the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) in Australia, the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States and the Medicines and Health care 
products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) in the United Kingdom – now decide which products 
pharmaceutical and medical device companies can market. They also monitor the safety of 
medicines and devices once they are on the market. 
There is no doubt that the tightening of regulation has prevented countless deaths and 
disabilities, and saved many lives. But regulation cannot always protect us from harm and 
events disturbingly similar to the thalidomide tragedy continue to occur. Let’s look at two 
recent examples. 
Vioxx pain drugs 
In the 1990s, a new class of anti-inflammatory medicines emerged – the “COX 2 inhibitors”. 
These pain drugs were touted as being less likely to cause gastric ulceration than existing 
treatments. 
One of these, rofecoxib (Vioxx), manufactured by Merck, was later withdrawn from the 
market, when it emerged that it increased the risk of myocardial infarction (heart attacks). 
It emerged that the company had deliberately misinterpreted and concealed some of the 
information it had about these risks, thus delaying the withdrawal of Vioxx from the market. 
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Questions were also raised about conflicts of interest – on the part of academic researchers 
who collaborated with Merck in running trials of Vioxx, members of the data safety 
monitoring board whose job it was to monitor trials of Vioxx, and members of FDA 
committees who assessed Vioxx. 
A number of class action lawsuits have followed, including one in Australia in 2010, which 
ruled against Merck. This decision was subsequently reversed, but this was because the 
judges decided it was not possible to causally link the particular claimant’s heart attack to his 
use of Vioxx. 
Merck has subsequently come to a settlement agreement with Australian patients. 
DePuy hip replacements 
Yet another class action lawsuit concluded in Australia this June. The action was brought 
against DePuy International Ltd and Johnson & Johnson Medical Pty Ltd, which were 
accused of being negligent in their design, manufacture and supply of a particular kind of hip 
implant. 
The story leading up to this will sound familiar: a promising new medical device – the DePuy 
ASR hip implant – was developed and marketed in the mid-2000s. The company claimed 
these implants would would reduce friction and wear, and improve patients’ mobility. 
Complication rates soon proved to be much higher than expected. Around 2,000 of the 5,500 
Australians who received the device have required, or are expected to require, revision 
surgery. 
The device was finally withdrawn in Australia in 2009 and worldwide in 2010. 
The company has subsequently been accused of not testing the implant adequately, and of 
knowing – and denying – that its device did not meet manufacturing specifications. 
As with the Vioxx case, concerns have been raised about possible conflicts of interest on the 
part of some of the surgeons who recommended the implant to their patients, and the 
regulators who evaluated it. 
Is there more to come? 
These two eerily similar events raise the question: can we do anything to reduce the 
likelihood of similar occurrences in future? 
There is certainly scope to tighten our governance of the pharmaceutical and medical device 
industries, and the behaviour of those who interact with them. We can also make our 
regulation of new medicines – and devices and surveillance of existing products – more 
robust. 
There are, however, several important limits to our capacity to prevent harms from medicines 
and medical devices – all of which help to explain why history keeps repeating itself. 
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First, pharmaceutical and medical device companies are commercial entities which invest 
billions of dollars in developing new medicines and devices. Tight regulations are in place 
and outright fraud is fortunately very rare. 
The commercial imperative is, however, powerful. As a result, there is always the possibility 
that studies of new medicines and devices will be designed, and their results interpreted and 
disseminated, in a manner that overstates their benefits, and underplays their risks. 
Second, most patients who are injured by medicines and medical devices sustain these 
injuries in the course of routine medical or surgical therapy – either because of unpredictable 
adverse events, such as allergic reactions to antibiotics, or because of unintended medical 
errors. 
The adage that “all medicines are poisons” is, unfortunately, true, and we need to accept that 
even the best physicians and surgeons are only human and will inevitably make mistakes. 
Third, we need to balance our desire for innovation and access to new technologies against 
our desire for safety and control. While there is definitely room to improve regulation and 
surveillance, we don’t want our clinicians and regulators to be so risk-averse that health 
technologies cannot make it onto the market or survive once they get there. 
Finally, while we might like to think that academic researchers, clinicians and regulators are 
committed solely to their the pursuit of knowledge, patients and the general public, the reality 
is they all need to earn money, and attract funding for their work. This inevitably creates a 
situation in which their “primary commitments” compete or conflict with other loyalties or 
with self-interest. 
We need to accept that “conflicts of interest” are part and parcel of all social roles. Therefore, 
there will never be a group of people whose only commitment is to protect patients. 
When this sobering fact of human nature is combined with the dangers of the commercial 
imperative, the inevitability of unpredictable side-effects and medical errors, and the need to 
balance our desires for safety against our desire for innovation, the future looks uncertain. 
The best we can hope for is that our systems of checks and balances will continue to be 
refined so that the “thalidomides of the future” will be caught and addressed as early as 
possible. 
 
